Lunedì 26 gennaio 2009, presso il Collegio Universitario Torleone , si è tenuto il terzo incontro di Etica per studenti del secondo anno di frequenza del Programma FIRE .
Il relatore è stato il dott. Massimo Tucciarelli.
IL PERCORSO DAL BENE REALE AL BENE IDEALE E DALL’APPETITO SENSIBILE ALLA VOLONTA’
In prima approssimazione, il bene è conosciuto come il giudizio dell’intelligenza su un’attrazione che scaturisce da qualcosa che è realmente presente di fronte a noi. L’attrazione, predominantly sensitive, something that stirs in us, which is characterized by being single-issue (in the sense that is involved), is evaluated from the right in its usefulness and pleasure in a variety of points of view, that the only reason is capable of considered together. The final assessment of intelligence tells us what is good, meaning that as the real usefulness and pleasure of the thing for us.
all good, by definition, is apparent in that it appears that the intelligence of those who are attracted. The experience of repentance stresses the distinction between good (merely) apparent and true good. This distinction is due to the fact that intelligence can will feel no pleasure or usefulness of the causes for us, but not all: some may remain unknown. An unknown cause can be decisive to reverse, with the experience, the rational prediction: what seemed good in reality may turn out bad. Another reason for the discrepancy between real and apparent good well is a strong attraction towards the sensitive thing: in some cases, this attraction is so strong that the person is necessary, just to be able to meet, not to consider a point of view that could be decisive for concluding that this thing is not good, or chooses not to attach importance to that aspect. This analysis goes back to Aristotle, who solved so the old problem of incontinence, that is why the man, while knowing the good, sometimes it does not. In both cases (lack of knowledge of a desired appearance or waiver to give importance to it) the intelligence assessment on the property is wrong, and this is the light of experience. The litmus test is that the person, having had the experience, she tells herself that if he could go back, not rifarebbe what he did.
The situation described here requires the perception of something that actually exists in front of us and attracts us. But this assumption leaves uncovered a significant part of human existence, one characterized by planning. Many dimensions of human life will move on to achieve a goal that, when it moves, it exists only in the mind: it is an idea, that human behavior gradually becomes a reality. How can an idea
exert a pull on us?
The answer can be given both in the perception of good and at the level of faculty. In both cases it assumes the characteristics of intelligence, we have reviewed elsewhere, and which include the ability to go beyond thought, any given limit (infinity intentional, in contrast to the finite factual).
Once that man, through the experience of the attraction of things useful and pleasant, has acquired the concept of good, even though this concept has been formed from the experience of a finite number of things, the intelligence to carry out 'the universalization of the concept. In this process we can make all the experience from something real that we like. We are always able to identify an aspect under which it might be better, that is to think of something that would please us more (if one existed). For example, if a person appeals to me because it is physically beautiful, and I appreciate its beauty I realize that is not very smart, and I'd like more una persona che, oltre che bella, fosse anche intelligente. Questo stesso processo può ripetersi all’infinito per tante altre qualità.
Perciò noi, partendo dall’esperienza di ciò che di fatto conosciamo come beni concreti, siamo capaci di costruirci l’idea di beni più perfetti sotto uno o più punti di vista. Questa idea costituisce il motore della nostra azione: noi ci muoviamo per realizzare le idee che abbiamo su ciò che sarebbe auspicabile che esistesse e rientra nel nostro potere, oppure per cercare qualcosa che corrisponda a ciò che noi pensiamo possa esistere. Questa dinamica è alla base dei fenomeni specificamente umani come la ricerca scientifica, le scoperte geografiche, l’imprenditorialità, etc. ..
It tells us how important the experience of good practice: if the experience is limited, even my "mental extrapolation" on the right can be limited, as this experience grows, the more you expand the contents of what I think of as a desirable to obtain. This observation is fundamental to education, which should not be much Transmission of rules that show what is good, so that you can forge a good life for their project.
The force with which the idea of \u200b\u200bthe possible good attracts us is vastly superior to that exercised, sensitive appetite, the good practice that lies ahead. Indeed, this attraction has an intensity proportional to the extent of intellectual vision, which transcends all limits given. That's why, to make or to find out that good, transforming our vision into reality, we are willing, in principle, to sacrifice the desires of the sensitive.
We experience so that we are bound to the attraction from the greater good, whether it is real "ideal" (if they somehow perceive the feasibility). We can not not want the greatest good that we know. When we plan a day, we unconsciously we fix a hierarchy between goods produced in those hours, and establish our programs according to this hierarchy. If someone forces us to change that program, we feel a pain. This suffering is a sign that we can not achieve our need, which is to do what we know as our greatest asset.
These observations are used to understand what the will. Intelligence, with its endless hours intentional innervates the sensitive appetite, leading him to be desired goods at their own level. This creates a new option, which we call will, and that is the appetite of reason. That option has an attractive force than that exerted by the specific appetite-sensitive goods, by reason of the fact that the goods received dalla ragione sono superiori a quelli che conosciamo con la sensibilità, e pertanto ci attraggono di più. Ecco perché noi abitualmente viviamo cercando di realizzare, in ogni contesto, il massimo bene che conosciamo: questo, possiamo dire, è l’oggetto proprio della volontà. Per farlo, siamo abitualmente disposti a rinunciare al godimento dei beni che pur attraggono l’appetito sensibile, quando tale godimento è incompatibile con ciò che “vogliamo”. Perché ciò che vogliamo ci attrae di più dei beni sensibili.
Questa visione permette di giustificare l’esistenza nell’uomo della facoltà volitiva come distinguibile dall’appetito sensibile, al tempo stesso rispettando la profonda unità dell’uomo nella sua esperienza attrattiva: sensibilità e intelligenza sono entrambe coinvolte nel determinare la volontà, e al tempo stesso la volontà se ne distingue perché unifica nei propri atti aspetti dell’una e aspetti dell’altra.
